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Non-technical summary 
The pharmaceutical industry has recently experienced numerous mergers and acquisitions. 
The number of studies which investigate the effects of pharmaceutical mergers is, however, 
rather limited. This paper studies the effects of the Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) merger on 
competition in the Swiss pharmaceutical market and compares the merger predictions of the 
Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) with the post-merger market developments.  
We find that the merger has had a miniscule impact on the Swiss pharmaceutical market. This 
has primarily to do with the fact that the product portfolios of both companies have shown no 
or only slight overlaps. In both cases of potential anticompetitive effects, the companies 
proposed to divest some of their assets in order to prevent a further strengthening of their 
dominant position. This included products in the development phase which were not available 
on the market at the time of the decision. In other markets in which either an overlapping of 
businesses of both companies existed or in which one of the merging entities held a dominant 
market position, no significant effects of the merger were noticed. This might have to do with 
both, existing price regulation in the Swiss drug industry and changes in Pfizer’s product 
portfolio following the merger. Furthermore, with respect to other potentially interesting 
market characteristics such as investment behaviour, R&D, sales or employment, available 
data on global company level does not allow an isolation of the possible effects of the merger.  
On the level of the specific merger case, we can deduce that the COMCO assessment of actual 
and potential competition in the Swiss pharmaceutical market has been largely correct. The 
market structure seems to be rather stable overall, however, varies within the different product 
categories. The competitive situation has been correctly assessed by the COMCO – for 
example, with respect to the presence of market entry barriers or the role of potential 
competition. Generally, the dynamic structure of the market often complicates the 
interpretation of, e.g., market share developments after the merger. 
On a more general level, the paper contributes to the growing literature on the evaluation of 
merger enforcement. Although the focus here is on an ex-post evaluation of a single merger 
decision, the fundamental problems of ex-post studies are nicely illustrated. In order to fully 
evaluate the work of the competition authority in a particular case, detailed data (and 
complementary information) is necessary to allow the use of sophisticated econometric 
techniques. However, such information is typically difficult to acquire, largely due to data 
confidentiality issues. In any case, it should be stated clearly that this paper focused on an 
assessment of a single merger and therefore does not allow any conclusion on a more general 
level. An evaluation of the overall merger enforcement policy in Switzerland or in another 
country is forced to use a much larger sample of mergers in order to allow the derivation of 
broader conclusions about the state of merger control and possible reform needs.  
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In den letzten Jahren hat die Pharmaindustrie zahlreiche Fusions- und Akquisitionsaktivitäten 
erlebt. Dennoch existieren nur eine Hand voll Studien, die die Effekte solcher 
Pharmafusionen analysieren. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die Effekte der Fusion von 
Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) auf den Wettbewerb im Schweizer Pharmamarkt und stellen die 
Fusionseinschätzungen der Schweizer Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO) den tatsächlichen 
Marktentwicklungen nach der Fusion gegenüber.  
Wir stellen fest, dass der Zusammenschluss von Pfizer und Pharmacia kaum den Wettbewerb 
auf dem Schweizer Pharmamarkt verändert hat. Die Gründe liegen in erster Linie darin, dass 
die aktuellen Produktportfolien der beiden Unternehmen nur wenige Überschneidungen 
aufwiesen. In den beiden kritischen Fällen wurden Auflagen ausgesprochen, die verhindern, 
dass eine marktbeherrschende Stellung verstärkt wird. Dabei wurden auch Produkte 
berücksichtigt, deren Markteinführung absehbar war. In den anderen Märkten, in denen es 
eine Überscheidung in den Geschäften der beiden Unternehmen gab oder eines der beiden 
Unternehmen eine marktbeherrschende Stellung inne hatte, waren Effekte der Fusion 
aufgrund der  Preisregulierung in der Schweizer Pharmaindustrie und den Änderungen im 
Pfizer’s Produktportfolio kaum feststellbar. Einige denkbare Effekte der Fusion wie 
beispielsweise auf das Investitionsverhalten, F&E, Erlös, Beschäftigung konnten nur auf 
Konzernebene untersucht werden. Ein Rückschluss auf den Zusammenschluss ist daher nicht 
eindeutig. 
Auf der Ebene des untersuchten spezifischen Fusionsfalls stellen wir insgesamt fest, dass die 
Beurteilung der WEKO zum aktuellen und potentiellen Wettbewerb auf dem Schweizer 
Pharmamarkt zutreffend war. Die Marktstruktur ist insgesamt eher stabil, differenziert aber 
zwischen den verschiedenen Produktkategorien. Die WEKO hat die Wettbewerbssituation 
korrekt eingeschätzt, beispielsweise bezüglich der Präsenz von Markteintrittbarrieren oder der 
Rolle des potentiellen Wettbewerbs. Insgesamt erschweren aber die dynamischen 
Entwicklungen des Marktes eine detaillierte Interpretation, beispielsweise der 
Marktanteilsentwicklungen nach der Fusion. 
Auf einer generelleren Ebene liefert der Aufsatz einen Beitrag zur wachsenden Literatur der 
Evaluation von Fusionsentscheidungen. Obwohl wir uns auf die Analyse einer einzelnen 
Fusion konzentrieren, veranschaulicht der Beitrag die fundamentalen Probleme und 
Herausforderungen von ex-post Studien. Um die Tätigkeiten der Wettbewerbsbehörden in 
einem bestimmten Fusionsfall vollständig zu beurteilen, sind detaillierte Daten (und 
zusätzliche Informationen) für die Durchführung ökonometrischer Analysen erforderlich. Im 
Regelfall sind solche Informationen jedoch oft kaum verfügbar, vor allem aufgrund von 
Vertraulichkeitsaspekten. In jedem Fall sollte abschliessend klar darauf hingewiesen werden, 
dass die Beurteilung einer einzelnen Fusion im Fokus dieses Beitrags steht und somit keine 
generelleren Schlussfolgerungen abgeleitet werden können. Um die gesamte Fusionspolitik 
und etwaiges Reformpotential in der Schweiz oder in einem anderen Land beurteilen zu 
können, ist die Untersuchung einer deutlich grösseren Anzahl an Fusionen erforderlich. 
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1 Introduction 
An assessment of the competitive effects of a merger is an integral part of an overall ex-post 
evaluation of competition policy. Reflecting upon this key role, the number of internal and 
external studies – conducted by competition authorities and outside experts, respectively – 
that focus on an evaluation of merger enforcement has increased significantly during the last 
couple of years.1 Generally, an ex-post assessment of merger decisions aims to evaluate 
whether the predictions of the competition authorities at the time of the merger decisions 
coincide with the actual effects of the mergers. In particular, it allows one to investigate the 
question whether the economic arguments applied by the antitrust authorities to evaluate the 
competitive effects of mergers have performed well in predicting the price and market share 
effects of the mergers. Furthermore, an ex-post assessment may shed light on the question 
whether the merger decision was the best possible in the sense that no alternative decision of 
the competition authority would have led to a better performance in terms of total or 
consumer welfare, respectively.  
The pharmaceutical industry has recently experienced numerous mergers and acquisitions. 
Control of pharmaceutical mergers involves, on the one hand, the standard analysis focusing 
on actual and potential price competition as well as market share effects of the merger. On the 
other hand, however, price competition in pharmaceutical markets may be rather restricted as 
drugs prices in most countries are subject to regulation. Competition may possibly take place 
along other dimensions such as innovation or advertising which are often much more difficult 
to assess in practice. Furthermore, market shares may also bear little information in such 
dynamic industries, especially because market power as measured by market share today does 
not immediately imply market power tomorrow. To address these issues, the European 
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) apply the “future products markets” or 
“innovation markets” concepts, respectively, within their merger control proceedings in 
innovation intensive industries.   
The number of studies which investigate the effects of horizontal mergers in the 
pharmaceutical industry is rather limited. In particular, the empirical literature on the motives 
of such mergers is not extensive and does not provide a clear answer to the question which 
motive is dominant: further integration to raise the company’s efficiency or alternatively 
further integration to increase market power. Hassan et al. (2007), for example, found 
abnormal returns and efficiency gains for acquisitions both in the short run and in the long 
run, but no abnormal returns for acquiring companies in the case of mergers. Furthermore, 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2005) found positive returns for acquirers in the case of acquisitions. 
Generally, the potentials for efficiency gains and motivations for mergers in the 
pharmaceutical industry are discussed in detail in CRA (2004). Often there is little concern 
regarding the presence of coordinated effects in innovation intensive industries such as 
pharmaceuticals (OECD, 2003a); consequently, competition authorities rather focus on the 
examination of the unilateral effects of mergers. 
The effects of pharmaceutical mergers on R&D incentives are also ambiguous: On the one 
hand, a merger might decrease the pressure on a company to be innovative and to develop 
rapidly successful new products. On the other hand, a merger often brings together 
complementary assets such as the competencies of various scientists which can cause 
increases in R&D productivity. With respect to the first effect, Danzon et al. (2004) find that 
post-merger integration may divert cash from the R&D activities of small merging firms and 
that mergers have little effect on the R&D investments for large companies (once the 
                                                 
1  See especially Pautler (2003) and LEAR (2006) for academic literature overviews and, for example, Competition Commission (2003), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005), CRA International (2007), Competition Commission (2008a) and Deloitte (2009) for studies with a 
focus on practice. A general overview of ex-post evaluations of merger enforcement and merger remedies performed by competition 
authorities can be found in OECD (2005). 
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propensity to merge has been controlled for). Ornaghi (2009) argues that mergers can harm 
innovation competition and that merged companies have on average worse innovation 
performances than non-merging firms. If the second effect prevails, the companies could be 
poised to spend more on R&D activities due to increased productivity. Cockburn and 
Henderson (1996) find in particular that ”up to a point” the productivity of research programs 
conducted within large firms will be significantly higher than those orchestrated by small 
firms. Economies of scale and scope as well as enhanced absorption of internal and external 
spillovers are the main advantages of running larger research efforts. Grabowski and Kyle 
(2008) argue on the contrary that very small firms with only a few projects in their R&D 
portfolio will benefit most from mergers with more experienced companies in the 
development of new drugs. 
Against this background, the paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on the 
evaluation of merger enforcement, looking at the ex-post economic effects of a merger in the 
Swiss pharmaceutical market, namely the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003). We find 
that the merger has had a miniscule impact on the Swiss pharmaceutical market. This has 
primarily to do with the fact that the product portfolios of both companies have shown no or 
only slight overlaps. In both cases of potential anticompetitive effects, the companies 
proposed to divest some of their assets in order to prevent a further strengthening of their 
dominant position. This included products in the development phase which were not available 
on the market at the time of the decision. In other markets in which either an overlapping of 
businesses of both companies existed or in which one of the merging entities held a dominant 
market position, no significant effects of the merger were noticed. This might have to do with 
both, existing price regulation in the Swiss drug industry and changes in Pfizer’s product 
portfolio following the merger. Furthermore, with respect to other potentially interesting 
market characteristics such as investment behaviour, R&D, sales or employment, available 
data on global company level does not allow an isolation of the possible effects of the merger. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the forthcoming second section, the merger of Pfizer 
and Pharmacia is shortly described, followed by a brief characterization of the methodological 
framework for the evaluation of pharmaceutical mergers and remedies. Subsequently, the 
evaluation results are depicted in two separate sections. While the overall results are presented 
in section 4, the assessment of the merger remedies is provided subsequently in section 5. The 
sixth section concludes the paper.   
2 The Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) merger at a glance 
The Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) received the notification of the proposed 
merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia on November 11, 2002. The merger was notified at the 
European Commission on October 25, 2002 and at the US FTC, the “Agreement and Plan of 
Merger” of Pfizer and Pharmacia was received on July 13, 2002.  
At the time of the merger notification, Pfizer was the largest pharmaceutical company in the 
US. Moreover, Pfizer was the largest manufacturer of animal health care products and one of 
the largest manufacturers of consumer health products worldwide (FTC, 2003a). The firm 
operated its own production plants in Switzerland. Pharmacia was engaged in research, 
development, production and sales of human pharmaceutical products, animal healthcare 
products, fine chemicals and consumer health products. The firm had no own production 
plants in Switzerland.  
The parties justified the merger due to increased demand for cheap but highly effective drugs 
in combination with cost increases in health care as well as the demographic developments. 
Moreover, it was argued that the pressure to consolidate increased due to the expiry of patent 
 6
protection for different drugs (see Table 1) and the likely market entry of generics. 
Furthermore, the companies strived for important synergies in the field of R&D. 
Table 1: Effects of patent expiry on the world largest pharmaceutical companies  
Company 2010 2011 2012 Share of 
revenue, 
(%) 
Astra 
Zeneca 
Arimidex USD2.2bn Seroquel USD4.7bn Symbicort USD3.7bn 38 
BMS   US Plavix 
Avapro 
USD4.8bn 
USD1.3bn 
Abilify USD2.1bn 30 
GSK Advair USD3.8bn   Avandia USD2.5bn 23 
Eli Lilly   Zyprexa USD4.8bn   22 
Merck Cozaar/ 
Hyzaar 
USD3.2bn   Singulair USD4.5bn 22 
Novartis Femara USD1.1bn   Diovan USD6.0bn 14 
Pfizer Aricept USD800m Lipitor 
Xalatan 
USD12.1bn 
USD1.6bn 
Viagra 
Detrol 
Geodon 
USD1.7bn 
USD860m 
USD1.1bn 
41 
Sanofi-
Aventis 
Taxotere USD2bn US Plavix 
Avapro 
USD3.8bn 
USD2.1bn 
Lovenox USD3.1bn 34 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (based on AXA Framlington data) 
The COMCO approved the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia on December 11, 2002 subject to 
certain remedies (WEKO, 2003). It stated that the merger would not considerably restrict 
actual competition and that potential competition exists within the Swiss pharmaceutical 
market. The imposed remedies obliged Pfizer and Pharmacia to divest the compound 
Darifenacin and transfer the rights of Pharmacia to develop and commercialize Apomorphine 
hydrochloride nasal spray for the treatment of erectile dysfunction (ED) to a competitor. 
The EU decision in favour of the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia was published on February 
27, 2003 (European Commission, 2003). The merger was approved subject to certain 
commitments in order to alleviate anticompetitive concerns resulting from the proposed 
transaction. At that time, the merger investigation in the US was not yet completed. The US 
decision in favour of the Pfizer and Pharmacia merger was published on April 14, 2003 (FTC, 
2003b). Again, the merger was approved subject to particular remedies. The pronounced 
remedies vary between Switzerland, the EU and the US.  
The Pfizer and Pharmacia merger must be viewed in light of the general M&A activities in 
the global pharmaceutical industry. A few years before the Pfizer and Pharmacia merger other 
mergers have taken place in the Swiss pharmaceutical market such as Roche/Corange (RPW 
1998/1), Hoechst/Rhone-Poulenc (RPW 1999/3) or Glaxo Wellcome PLC/SmithKline 
Beecham PLC (RPW 2001/2). As a consequence of the numerous M&A activities in the 
pharmaceutical industry and due to lag effects (such as the effects of mergers on innovation 
competition, or competition with future products) an isolated analysis of the effects of the 
Pfizer and Pharmacia merger becomes difficult. 
3 A methodological framework to evaluate mergers 
3.1 Overall merger evaluation: aims and methods 
The economic literature on ex-post assessments of merger decisions identifies especially two 
key aims of such investigations (see generally LEAR, 2006). First, it should be established 
whether the merger decision of the competition authority has achieved the economic goal of 
the merger control regulation to a larger degree than any other alternative decision. Second, it 
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should be assessed whether the analysis of the competition authority behind its merger 
decision has been correct and complete.  
To achieve the first aim, counterfactuals to the respective merger decision must be identified. 
Subsequently, the post-merger actual market developments should be compared with the 
market developments that would have taken place under alternative decisions. Finally, welfare 
should be measured and compared under the different scenarios.  
To meet the second aim, major arguments that have led to a merger decision should be 
identified initially (for example, relevant market, possible anticompetitive threats and 
presence of any countervailing factors), followed by an evaluation of the validity of each of 
the major arguments. Finally, it should be verified whether the key arguments have been 
complete. 
For the specific case of merger evaluation in the pharmaceutical industry it is necessary to 
focus on both, general merger effects analysis (in particular competition with regard to the 
actual products) and an analysis of the specific effects reflecting the industry’s dynamic 
nature (in particular competition with regard to future products and innovation competition). 
In doing so, the specific issues of merger control in innovation intensive industries are also 
relevant for the ex-post evaluation of merger decisions in such industries. While the US 
merger control in research-intensive industries applies the ‘innovation markets’ concept 
(contained in the 1996 “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” by the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC), the European Commission does not have any 
specific guidelines and uses the ’future products markets’ concept within the potential 
competition analysis under the general horizontal merger guidelines. 
In sum, an evaluation of merger decisions in pharmaceutical markets should, on the one hand, 
investigate whether the merger had any anticompetitive effects (for example, significant price 
increases or changes in market shares). These are rather the short-term and mid-term effects 
of the merger. On the other hand, it should be examined whether the merger did not cause 
negative effects on innovation competition (‘innovation markets’ approach) and/or the 
potential competition with regard to future products (‘future products markets’ approach). 
These are rather the long-term effects of the merger. 
The approaches to evaluate mergers in innovation intensive industries are not well 
established. The toolbox of possible methods for an analysis of the effects of a merger in 
traditional industries, which may be applied in dynamic industries as well, contains the 
following techniques:  
Descriptive statistics analysis: This includes the analysis of market concentration, market 
shares, prices, etc. before and after the merger. 
Compared to the traditional industries, an analysis of market shares might be less informative 
in innovation intensive industries. The dynamic nature of such markets makes an assessment 
more difficult. For example, a high market share today in a dynamic market does not 
necessarily imply the presence of market power tomorrow (OECD, 2001). It should also be 
noted that the prices of drugs in many countries are subject to regulation, which make it 
difficult to raise prices after the merger. Therefore, the analysis has to focus on products 
whose prices are not regulated.  
Interviews: Companies (merging parties and their competitors) and business/customer 
associations can be interviewed to discover the impact of the merger on market developments 
or their predictions concerning what would have happened in the absence of the merger or 
under alternative remedy scenarios. Interviews enable access to information which may not be 
inferred through simple outside observance of the respective markets. Moreover, this 
information helps to facilitate a better interpretation of the observed statistical tendencies.  
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With respect to pharmaceutical markets, an understanding of the market functioning can be 
gained through conversations with industry experts. Interviews can be used in particular to 
analyze any anti-competitive effects of the merger on, for example, generics competition, 
market entry/market exit, or any efficiency gains from the merger and, thus, can help to get an 
impression on the overall welfare effects of a merger. Furthermore, effects of the merger on 
innovation competition or on potential product market competition can be identified from 
talks with industry insiders. These effects are usually difficult to observe for a researcher 
acting outside of the industry.  
Empirical analysis: These methods mainly cover structural models and simulations, event 
studies and evaluation methods.2 
Structural models may be estimated to simulate price and market share effects and quantify 
the welfare effects of a merger (for example, Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), Nevo 
(2000), Werden and Froeb (2006), OFT (2007)). Due to the high data and time requirements 
for structural models estimation and sophisticated simulations, the US and UK competition 
authorities often apply simple ‚back-of-the-envelope’ formulas which allow a rough 
estimation of the (hypothetical) price effects of mergers (see for example, Nelson and Sun 
(2001) and OFT (2002))3. However, possible biases from using these formulas to calculate 
consumer savings should be taken into account.  
The abnormal stock market performance of merging parties and their rivals is analysed around 
the time of merger announcements and antitrust challenges in so-called event studies (see for 
example, Duso et al. (2007a, 2010), Duso et al. (2007b)). Such studies may allow for a 
differentiation between efficiency and market power effects of mergers. 
The conjunctive idea behind the so-called evaluation methods (for example, social 
experiments, natural experiments, matching methods, and instrument variable methods) is a 
comparison of the reactions to a merger between two groups of firms: a control group and an 
experimental group. Ceteris paribus, the identified differences in the performance of the two 
groups should give an estimate of the merger effects (see, for example, Ashenfelter and 
Hosken (2008), Ashenfelter et al. (2009) for an overview of the methodologies to estimate the 
price effects of mergers4). 
Since each of the approaches described above has its merits and drawbacks and the 
approaches are in general not mutually exclusive but can complement each other, the 
preferred approach would be to apply more than one method in order to derive results from a 
merger evaluation as reliable as possible (see LEAR, 2006). Since this may not be always 
possible, the application of certain approaches will depend on data availability and the nature 
of the market.  
Given the existing data constraints, a quantitative analysis of the effects of the Pfizer and 
Pharmacia merger and the estimation of welfare gains was not possible. In addition, only a 
few Swiss pharmaceutical companies and associations responded to our request for an 
interview. Therefore, our case study concentrates on the analysis of price and market share 
effects before and after the merger as well as its possible impact on investment behaviour, 
R&D, sales and employment. As part of the analysis, we contrasted the actual market 
developments after the merger against the predictions of the COMCO at the time of the 
decision to find out whether the merger decision was sound given the information the 
COMCO had available at that time, whether the reasoning behind the merger decision was 
                                                 
2  A comprehensive description of these methods and their strengths and weaknesses can be found in LEAR (2006). 
3    On the calculation of consumer savings from US merger enforcement at the US Department of Justice, see, for example, Werden (2008). 
For an overview of the retrospective analysis at the FTC, see, for example, Farrell et al. (2009). 
4     See, for example, Weinberg (2007) for a survey of studies on the price effects of horizontal mergers. 
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clear and supported by the evidence, and whether the COMCO predictions about future 
market developments proved to be correct.5  
3.2 Evaluation of remedies: aims and methods 
Typically, remedies in merger cases are pronounced if there are competition concerns in 
certain markets affected by the proposed merger. Remedies should focus on maintaining 
competition at pre-merger levels. In an evaluation of the imposed remedies it should thus be 
examined whether the remedy has reached this objective (i.e., preserving effective 
competition), and whether it has reached this objective in the way expected by the 
competition authority at the time of the decision (i.e., the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
the merger remedy should be investigated). In case the results indicate that the remedy has not 
elicited the desired effect, subsequently the reasons for this failure should be examined in 
greater detail.  
In an evaluation of the effectiveness of remedies, it is important to fully understand the 
reasons for the choice of the remedies. Furthermore, market developments before and after the 
imposition of remedies should be analyzed to investigate competitive effects of merger 
remedies and to infer about the overall impact of the remedy on competition. Finally, it should 
be examined whether the remedy has worked out the way it has been expected and 
conclusions should be drawn with regard to improving the effectiveness of remedies. In 
particular, the FTC, European Commission and UK Competition Commission have 
undertaken studies into the effectiveness of merger remedies (see FTC (1999), European 
Commission (2005), Competition Commission (2008b))6. However, these studies have not 
focused on the analysis of competitive effects of merger remedies.  
The analysis of remedies in innovation intensive industries could differ from the analysis of 
remedies in traditional industries. In the pharmaceutical industry, remedies have often been 
pronounced in order to alleviate foreclosure concerns with regard to R&D input. In addition, 
remedies have also been imposed on products with current overlaps in order to remove 
competition concerns with regard to products already launched as well as with regard to 
products for which the merging company has promising R&D (see CRA, 2004).  
Generally, the analysis of remedies for the products which are in the last stage of development 
and those products for which the new drug application has already been submitted can be 
evaluated in the short or medium term. The analysis of remedies with regard to products in an 
earlier development stage is often very complicated. Two aspects are of particular importance 
here: an estimation of the probability that the product will enter the market at all and an 
estimation of the success of the remedies. In general, the effects of remedies on innovation 
competition are often difficult to assess and can be evaluated only in the long run due to the 
long development periods and a great uncertainty concerning the success of the project.7 
The appropriate methods for an analysis of the remedies in case of pharmaceutical mergers 
are similar to those of overall merger evaluation. These are interviews with firms and business 
associations, descriptive analysis of market concentration, market shares and prices in the 
markets with remedies as well as empirical studies (event studies, simulations, and evaluation 
studies). Interviews are an important method to investigate the potential market developments 
which would have occurred absent the merger remedies and under other counterfactual 
scenarios. An analysis of descriptive statistics may allow one to investigate the development 
                                                 
5     A similar approach has been in particular applied by Deloitte (2009). 
6  Other relevant studies on merger remedies are, for example, OECD (2003b), Sullivan (2003) and Motta et al. (2007). 
7  For a more detailed discussion of the question whether the divested assets will become an effective source of competition in the case of 
competing R&D programs, see OECD (2001). 
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of prices and market shares in the markets where remedies had been imposed and hypothesize 
about competitive effects of merger remedies.  
Stock market reactions around the final decision of the competition authority may be 
evaluated in order to draw some inferences about the outcome of the bargaining process 
between the competition authority and the merging parties (see Duso et al. (2007b)). Event 
studies may, thus, answer the question whether the remedies were imposed for the “right” 
mergers, i.e., mergers that increase market power, and help to evaluate the effectiveness of 
remedies looking at the profitability effects around the various decision dates. Pre- and post-
divestiture performance may be compared in evaluation studies. Simulation of merger 
remedies (through changing the structure of the industry) is possible on the basis of estimating 
structural models and by applying more basic simulation tools.   
In terms of related studies, two particular papers examine the effects of remedies in 
pharmaceutical markets. Morgan (2001) generally analyses the effects of mergers on 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, and in particular, takes a closer look at the effects 
of remedies for three mergers Glaxo/Wellcome, Upjohn/Pharmacia and Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz. 
She concludes that a careful design of merger remedies is necessary in cases of R&D projects 
and components.8 In another study, Tenn and Yun (2009) analyse the success of divestitures 
relating to Johnson&Johnson acquisition of Pfizer’s consumer health division in 2006 in the 
boundaries of the Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) merger decision in the US. The authors find 
that, in general, the divestitures helped to maintain the level of competition which was 
observed prior to the transaction.9 In addition, a sample of pharmaceutical mergers with 
remedies adopted by the European Commission (Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim, 
Monsanto/Pharmacia&Upjohn, Sanofi/Synthélabo, Astra/Zeneca and Glaxo 
Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham) has been investigated by Davies and Lyons (2007) by 
applying basic simulation techniques. They find that “remedies are needed to restore 
competition, not just market structure”. 
In the case of the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia, competition concerns have been 
pronounced by the COMCO regarding products that were still in development (either in 
earlier or later stages) and remedies were respectively proposed by the parties in those 
markets to solve the concerns. In this respect, section 5 below follows the aim of examining 
the effects of those remedies on competition in the respective pharmaceutical product 
categories. In order to attain this objective, especially the following questions will be 
answered:  
  1. What is the subject of the remedy? 
  2. What was the intention of the remedy? 
  3. Who bought the product subject to the remedy?  
  4. How did the market develop after the merger and with the remedies? 
  5. How would the market have developed without the remedies? 
  6. Evaluation: Were the remedies effective, were they necessary? 
                                                 
8  The study is based on data contained in the merger decisions and obtained from a number of interviews supplemented by 
correspondence with competition officials, industry experts and practitioners.  
9  This study applies the so-called “before-and-after” and “difference-in-difference” estimators to analyze the impact of the divestiture on 
sales, retail distribution and prices. 
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4 The Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) merger: Findings from the 
evaluation of the overall case 
In this section, we first describe the merger notification by the COMCO and overlaps in the 
business fields of Pfizer and Pharmacia as well as the definition of the relevant markets, 
followed by a discussion of the COMCO predictions concerning market shares and actual 
developments in the entire Swiss pharmaceutical market and in individual pharmaceutical 
categories with competition concerns after the merger decision. Subsequently, the impact of 
the merger on generics competition, innovation competition, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), sales, employment and investment is analysed. The section is concluded by an overall 
assessment of actual and potential competition comparing the COMCO predictions and actual 
market developments after the merger. This allows for the derivation of the final finding 
whether the analysis in the merger decision has been complete and correct. 
4.1 Merger notification by the COMCO 
Pfizer and Pharmacia were allowed to submit a simplified merger notification according to 
Art. 12 of the Swiss Merger Control Regulation (VKU) (WEKO, 1996). They were not 
subject to submit any information regarding the markets in which the market shares thresholds 
were lower than 20% (for markets in which both parties were active), or 30% (for markets in 
which one of the merging parties was active). Additionally, the parties proposed, firstly, that 
the Swiss merger notification should include only additional information which is not 
contained in the EU merger notification and, secondly, that the COMCO should generally 
take the EU merger notification into consideration during its investigation. Both proposals 
aimed at avoiding duplication of work by the merging parties and were accepted by the 
COMCO. However, it asked the merging parties to hand in additional information regarding 
their R&D activities.  
4.2 Overlaps in the business fields of Pfizer und Pharmacia 
Despite the large size of Pfizer and Pharmacia, there were only minor overlaps in the business 
fields of the companies before the merger (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Overlaps in the business fields of Pfizer and Pharmacia 
Pfizer Pharmacia 
General fields  
Development, manufacturing and 
marketing of medicines 
Development, manufacturing and 
marketing of medicines 
Prescription medicines   
Treatment of cardiovascular and infectious 
diseases  
Central nervous system disorders 
Diabetes 
Erectile dysfunction 
Allergies 
Arthritis 
Arthritis 
Overactive bladder 
Parkinson’s 
Cancer 
Eye diseases 
Hormonal imbalances 
Non-prescription medicines  
Painkillers 
Colds 
Sleep problems 
Skin and eye care 
Drugs against nicotine addiction  
Hair loss 
Colds (nasal sprays) 
Vitamin deficiency 
Fungal diseases 
Other  
Animal healthcare products Animal healthcare products 
Confectionary products like chewing gums, 
bubble gums, mints and cough drops 
Diagnostic products, blood test systems, 
fine chemicals and biopharmaceutical 
activities  
Source: COMCO merger decision (published in RPW/DPC 2003/2) 
As a result of the merger, the product portfolio of Pfizer was enlarged. Before the merger, 
Pfizer had a number of own important products such as Zoloft, Lipitor and Viagra. Due to the 
merger, Pfizer incorporated Pharmacia products such as Celebrex, Beztra, Detrol, Nicorette, 
Rogaine and Luden. 11 out of 12 combined blockbuster drugs of Pfizer and Pharmacia are 
patented until 2010 (New York Times, 2002). The pipeline of products in the last stage of 
development was enlarged by a number of promising Pharmacia products (such as 
Eplerenone, Parecaxib, and CDP-870).  
According to the decision of the COMCO, the business field of confectionary products like 
chewing gums, bubble gums, mints and cough drops should be sold in the medium term. The 
FTC has pronounced a separate remedy for over-the-counter cough drops, namely the 
divestiture of the Halls cough drop business to Cadbury Schweppes. Pfizer and Pharmacia 
were the only two significant competitors in this market. However, for this business field, no 
remedies were pronounced in either the Swiss or the EU merger decisions. 
In 2006, Pfizer sold its business unit Consumer Healthcare (which belonged to Pharmacia 
before the merger) to Johnson&Johnson together with the announcement of its intention to 
focus on the pharmaceutical business (Pfizer, 2006). With this step, Pfizer aims to intensify 
internal R&D as well as the development of a selection of new drugs. Pfizer has also planned 
to continue to buy products and technologies which could promote the long-term growth of its 
business. After the merger, Pfizer purchased products, product candidates and technologies, in 
particular in such therapeutic fields as Alzheimer’s, diabetes, obesity and infectious diseases. 
4.3 Definition of the relevant markets 
The relevant product market was defined by the COMCO on the basis of the therapeutic 
classes of the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification with “level 3”. 
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According to the ATC classification, human pharmaceutical products are grouped into the 
respective therapeutic groups according to the organ or system which they affect and/or their 
chemical and therapeutic characteristics. The ATC classification was also used by the 
European Commission and the FTC in their respective merger investigations.  
In individual product categories, the pharmaceutical markets can be defined more broadly or 
more narrowly. In the US and the EU decisions, a further delineation of the market was 
undertaken, for example in the market for ED drugs (prescription vs. non-prescription 
products, pills vs. injections in the EU merger decision) or in the market for incontinence 
drugs (“extended release” products which are to be taken once or twice a day vs. products 
which are to be taken three times a day in the US merger decision).10  
The key difficulty in an assessment of competition for products currently under development 
is uncertainty. There are many compounds at the beginning of the product development cycle, 
however, in each development stage, the number of the possible compounds is reduced. Even 
in the clinical tests stage, there is a high probability that a product will not enter the market. 
Thus, the existence of a product in the development stage may not necessarily lead to actual 
competition in final consumer markets in the future. For this reason, the European 
Commission has decided to consider only the products in the final stages (Phase III) of the 
clinical trials (OECD, 2001) in their merger analyses. A further uncertainty arises from the 
fact that the decision into which ATC category a product falls is made only shortly before 
market approval.  
The geographically relevant market was defined to be national in scope in the COMCO 
merger decision. This is also a widely used practice of the European Commission. Although 
there is a trend toward standardization at the European level, national markets are still distinct 
markets with price differences due to different administrative procedures, price regulation, 
reimbursement policies, and differences in brand, sizing and distribution systems (see EU 
merger decision (European Commission, 2003)). At present, the procedure of defining 
national geographic markets in such a way appears to be a reasonable approach in this 
industry. With regard to future products, the European Commission defined the markets to be 
at least European Economic Area (EEA) or even worldwide in scope since research and 
development activities are usually performed at the global level.  
While the COMCO followed the approach of the European Commission and the FTC in their 
investigation of the case, it had applied internationally recognized methods for defining the 
relevant markets in the pharmaceutical industry. It further takes into account the numerous 
specifics of this market – in particular the high uncertainty with regard to new products.  
4.4 Analysis of market shares, concentration and prices 
In this section we analyze the changes of the market shares in the overall Swiss 
pharmaceutical market as well as market shares and price changes in the individual product 
categories and compare them with the COMCO predictions. This allows us to assess whether 
the analysis of the competitive effects in the merger decision has been correct. To conduct the 
analysis, we used data from IMS Health Switzerland on sales revenues and quantities of drugs 
to calculate average prices and market shares of drugs. 
4.4.1  Analysis for the entire pharmaceutical market 
The COMCO expected that after the merger, Pfizer and Pharmacia would advance from - at 
that time - positions six and eight to the second largest player in the Swiss pharmaceutical 
                                                 
10  Another definition of the relevant market could be distinguishing original drugs from generics, as suggested in, for example, Stern 
(1996). Such an approach would be an example for a broader market definition. 
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market (see Table 3). Post-merger, according to 2006 IMS Health Switzerland data, Pfizer is 
the second largest company in the Swiss pharmaceutical market.  
Table 3: Switzerland: Market shares for the total market 
Rank 
before 
(after) 
Company Market share in 
the total market, 
% (estimate) 
Rank 2006 Market share in 
the total market, 
% (actual 2006)* 
1 (1) Novartis 
(Pharma&Consumer 
Health) 
5-10 1 10.7 
2 (-) Pfizer&Pharmacia 5-10 2 7.3 
3 (2) AstraZeneca 5-10 4 6.7 
4 (3) GSK Pharma 5-10 3 6.8 
5 (4) Roche Pharma 
Schweiz 
5-10 6 5.5 
6 (5) MSD-Chibret 5-10   
- (6) Pfizer 0,1-5   
7 (7) Sanofi-Synthelabo 0,1-5   
- (8) Pharmacia 0,1-5   
8 (9) Janssen-Cilag 0,1-5   
9 (10) Bristol-Myers/Squibb 0,1-5 11 2.3 
10 (11) Aventis Pharma 0,1-5   
 Sanofi-Aventis  5 6.2 
 Johnson&Johnson  10 2.7 
 Merck&Co  8 3.5 
 Bayer Healthcare  9 2.9 
 Merpha  7 3.8 
Source: COMCO merger decision (published in RPW/DPC 2003/2), 2006 data from IMS Health Switzerland  
Note: * APO/SD/SPI/DRO Index, Swissmedic A, B, C, D, Z including vaccines. 
MSD-Chibret belongs to Merck&Co. Janssen-Cilag is a subsidiary of Johnson&Johnson. Sanofi-Synthelabo and 
Aventis merged in 2004.  
According to the VKU, in order to be able to evaluate the potential effects of a merger, all 
relevant markets must be analyzed in which one of the merging parties holds a market share 
of at least 30% or in which both parties together reach a market share of at least 20%. Such an 
analysis must include the sales and demand structure as well the R&D role in the respective 
markets. In the Pfizer and Pharmacia merger case, a number of product markets with potential 
competition concerns were identified. Some products in these categories are recorded in the 
so-called SL-list (Spezialitätenliste), which includes all prescription drugs. The prices for 
drugs on the SL-list are fixed by the Federal Office of Public Health (BAG). For these SL-list 
products, no price effects as a result of the merger are to be expected. However, although the 
regulated prices of existing drugs remain constant in the short-term, the negotiating power of 
Pfizer could be strengthened after the merger. Consequently, there could be a tendency to fix 
higher prices in future negotiations. Insofar the prices could be higher post merger than they 
would be without it. However, such an effect could at best be identified in the long term in 
comparison to other firms or other markets. The prices of all other products (the so-called 
over-the-counter drugs) are not regulated.  
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For most of the drugs in our sample (especially for the regulated ones), no significant price 
changes after the merger could be observed based on our data. Due to the minor price 
variation, it was not reasonable to conduct empirical estimations regarding the impact of the 
merger on market prices. Likewise, merger simulations of price changes were not sensible.  
The COMCO found that the increase in the market shares due to the merger would be either 
minor or there existed important competitors in the respective markets which could challenge 
the position of the merged entity. As previously mentioned above, the expiry of patents, the 
introduction of new products and generics competition can lead to quick and substantial 
changes in the market shares. After the merger the market shares of Viagra, Caverject and 
Norvasc have considerably decreased. The market shares of the other products, especially of 
the regulated ones, have remained relatively stable between 2001 and 2005. 
In sum, one can deduce that COMCO assessment has been largely correct as reflected in the 
post-merger market developments.  
4.4.2 Analysis for individual markets 
In the following, a few individual pharmaceutical categories are discussed in more detail. In 
particular, the markets G2A Oxytocics and A7A Intestinal antiinfectives are analyzed because 
the prices in these product categories are not regulated. Thus, some effects of the merger on 
prices could be expected. Furthermore, two other product markets, namely G4B3 products for 
the treatment of ED and G4B4 products against urinary incontinence, are investigated more 
closely because remedies were imposed in these markets to solve general competition 
concerns and with respect to innovation behaviour in particular. For each of these product 
categories, the market before the merger is described on the basis of the COMCO predictions, 
followed by a comparison of the prices and market shares of the respective drugs before and 
after the merger to investigate whether the merger may have had any impact on competition in 
these product categories. 
1) Market G2A: Oxytocics 
COMCO description of the market before the merger 
The market G2A Oxytocics was defined at the level ATC-3. This is a product category in 
which both merging parties were active. Pharmacia alone had a market share of above 30% 
with the products Prostin E2, Prepidil and Prostin F2 Alpha. Together with Pfizer’s product 
Pitressin (share of 0.1-10%), both firms would have reached a total market share of 40-50% 
(see Appendix, Table 8). The COMCO predicted that the increase in sales volume as a 
consequence of the merger would be minor. Besides, there existed several competitors within 
this product category, who could exercise competitive pressure on the merging parties. 
Developments of prices and market shares after the merger 
The prices for Pfizer’s products Prepidil and Prostin E2 have remained stable before and after 
the merger (see Appendix, Figure 5). The price for Prepidil remained constant at CHF50. The 
price for Prostin is volatile.  
The market shares of Pfizer have decreased from 15.5% in 2001 to 10.3% in 2005 (see 
Appendix, Table 9). Novartis Pharma was able to secure its dominant market position after 
the merger.  
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2) Market A7A: Intestinal antiinfectives 
COMCO description of the market before the merger 
The market A7A Intestinal antiinfectives was defined at the level ATC-3. This is a product 
segment in which only Pfizer was active with its product Humatin and had a market share of 
more than 30% (see Appendix, Table 8). Remarkably, Pfizer and its competitor Drossapharm 
were able to considerably gain market shares in the period 2001/2002. This was at the 
expense of Abbott and Sanofi-Synthelabo who withdrew their products from the market in 
2001/2002. This market is an example for the frequently observed pharmaceutical market 
characteristic that market shares can be volatile despite a high concentration at a certain point 
in time. Thus, a dominant market position today may not necessarily imply such a position in 
the future. The COMCO stated that other producers in this market would exercise competitive 
pressure on Pfizer and Pharmacia post-merger, first and foremost Drossapharm with its 40-
50% market share. 
Developments of prices and market shares after the merger 
The prices for Pfizer’s Humatin have remained stable before and after the merger as well as 
the prices of its competitors such as Bioforce with Gastronol and Drossapharm with 
Neomycine (see Appendix, Figure 6).  
The market shares of Pfizer have increased between 2001 and 2005 (see Appendix, Table 9). 
Abbott’s product is no longer in the market and its market share was almost entirely 
distributed to Pfizer. After the merger, the market share of Pfizer grew further. In the period 
from 2001 to 2005, the market share of Drossapharm was subject to considerable fluctuations.  
Generally, the analysis of the data shows that Pfizer has strengthened its market position. This 
example provides an additional illustration of the frequently observed volatility of market 
shares in pharmaceutical markets. Market entries and exits can change the market structure 
significantly in a relatively short period of time. As previously described above, this makes 
the market definition as well as the assessment of potential competition a challenging 
endeavour.  
3) Market G4B3: Products for the ED treatment 
COMCO description of the market before the merger 
In the COMCO merger decision, the market ’products for ED treatment’ was defined at the 
level ATC-4. Both Pfizer and Pharmacia were present in this market. Pfizer’s Viagra had a 
market share of 90-100% and Pharmacia’s Caverject a share of 0.1-10% (see Appendix, Table 
8). The COMCO has observed that both of the products of the merging parties do not directly 
compete with each other. Pharmacia’s Caverject (in injection form) and Pfizer’s Viagra (in 
oral dosage form) are not viewed as ‘close enough’ substitutes. Caverject is usually needed in 
those cases where Viagra is contra-indicated and/or provides no results. The merger is 
therefore not expected to significantly affect the existing market position of Pfizer. 
The COMCO had, however, competition concerns in relation to a substitutive product of 
Pharmacia in the development stage – Apomorphine hydrochloride nasal spray. This product 
could be assigned to a market relatively reliably, since the same product in the form of pills 
(Uprima) was already in the market and competed directly against Viagra. In comparison to 
Uprima, Apomorphine is only another dosage form of the product. Thus, the probability that 
the new product will appear in this category was very high. In order to ease competition 
concerns, Pharmacia suggested divesting this product. 
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In terms of the general market developments, the COMCO stated that new competitors’ 
products (Abbott’s Uprima, Eli Lilly’s Cialis, Bayer Schering’s Levitra) would enter into the 
market and thus erode Pfizer’s market share.  
Developments of prices and market shares after the merger 
The prices of Pfizer’s Caverject and Caverject DC were stable before as well as after the 
merger (see Appendix, Figure 7). Both products can be found on the SL-list; the prices of the 
other products in this product category are not regulated. In the period from 2001 to 2005, the 
prices of Viagra have increased by 10.5%. Since January 2003, the price of Viagra has 
increased by 6.6%. The prices for the competitors’ products Cialis (Eli Lilly) and Levitra 
(Bayer Schering) have increased considerably in the same time period. The price of Cialis has 
increased by 52.4% since market entry and the price of Levitra by 35.1%.11 
Pfizer’s market share in this product category has decreased considerably from 97.4% in 2001 
to 60.7% in 2005 (see Appendix, Table 9). Since its market entry in 2004, Eli Lilly’s Cialis 
gained significant market share leading to 23.7% in 2005. Bayer’s Levitra has also become a 
strong competitor of Viagra. The low market shares of Uprima can be explained with some 
serious side effects of the product.  
4) Market G4B4: Products for the treatment of incontinence  
In the COMCO merger decision, the market of ‘products for the treatment of incontinence’ 
was defined at the ATC-3 level. At the time of the merger notification only Pharmacia was 
active in this category with its product Detrusitol (see Appendix, Table 8). Pfizer was not 
active in this segment, but the product Darifenacin was already in the last development stage 
(Phase III of the clinical tests). The COMCO stated that Detrusitol and Darifenacin must be 
considered as close substitutes. It was anticipated that in the event of market entry, the 
dominant market position of Pharmacia with a market share of 50-60% would further be 
strengthened. Madaus was the only company among the other four competitors in this market 
which had a significant market share of about 20-30%. 
Given the identified competition concerns, Pfizer and Pharmacia offered to divest 
Darifenacin. The COMCO stated that, if this remedy is implemented, there is no further need 
to define an innovation market. 
In the EU merger decision (European Commission, 2003), some possible competitors were 
mentioned who also develop products for the respective market: Schwarz Pharma with the 
product Fesoterodine, and AstraZeneca with a compound in the development phase. However, 
lack of data and information for this product category foreclosed a closer investigation of the 
market developments after the merger as well as possible impacts of the divestiture on 
competition in this product category.  
To sum up, the analysis of market developments before and after the merger in individual 
product categories has shown that the arguments and predictions of the COMCO have been 
sound given the information available at the time of the merger decision. The post-merger 
market developments showed no unexpected price or market share increases and therefore 
raise no doubts on the correctness of the merger decision. 
                                                 
11  Due to the increasing prices of Viagra, Levitra and Cialis, in 2006 the COMCO initiated an investigation whether particularly the 
recommended retail prices for ED drugs, which are published in the database of e-mediat AG (Galdat, Pharmavista), factually act as a 
device to fix prices. The investigation was opened against Pfizer AG, Bayer (Schweiz) AG und Eli Lilly (Suisse) SA, e-mediat AG, 
wholesalers Galexis AG, Unione Farmaceutica Distribuzione SA, Voigt AG, Amedius-UE SA, as well as against pharmacists and SD-
physicians. In 2009, the COMCO confirmed that the recommended retail prices led to the fixing of resale prices for ED drugs and 
imposed a fine of CHF 5.7.m on Pfizer, Eli Lilly and Bayer. 
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4.5 Analysis of innovation competition 
An analysis of innovation competition involves an assessment whether a merger would lead to 
more or less innovation. While conducting such an analysis, it should be taken into account 
whether the merging parties have a larger or smaller incentive to invest in R&D and how the 
incentives for the competitors are possibly affected. Considering the long lead times, an 
immediate post-merger increase of the R&D effort can rather not be expected. On the 
contrary, it could be the case that running projects are terminated so that the products at the 
development stage are not pursued further. One reason for such behaviour could be that the 
merging firms already have a comparable product so that an additional product would not 
create an additional market but would possibly instead lead to in-firm cannibalization. Exactly 
due to such fears, the Pfizer and Pharmacia merger has been approved subject to the 
imposition of remedies.  
In the medium and long run, it is likely that R&D in the merged firm will be restructured. If a 
duplication of certain tasks can be avoided, the efficiency of R&D activities will likely 
increase. To achieve this goal, scientists with complementary abilities from the previously 
independent firms have to work together. Additionally, the higher cash flow of a larger firm 
can be used for new projects which would have been too large or too risky for one of the 
independent firms prior the merger. Consequently, in such cases, only the merger makes the 
implementation of some research programs feasible.  
However, contrary to this line of reasoning, a merger can also decrease R&D incentives. In 
the first place, such an effect could occur in cases in which the most important competitor in 
the development of new active substances ceased to exist due to the merger. Furthermore, it 
could also be the case that a consolidation of IPR portfolios creates a significant market entry 
barrier which successfully deters competitors from entering the market dominated by the 
merged company. For this reason, the imposed divestitures consider IPR portfolios. As part of 
the realization of merger synergies, some R&D institutions (laboratories, personnel) might be 
closed after the merger (see CRA, 2004). Although in theory, R&D efficiency gains can 
overcompensate the welfare losses created by anticompetitive effects, empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that such cases occur rather seldom.  
With the proposed merger, Pfizer was striving to realize significant synergies in the field of 
R&D. It was expected that the previous activities of both companies would complement each 
other very well and that no impairment of the R&D activity in general or within the individual 
product categories was anticipated. Since both companies are active worldwide and 
innovation markets are usually defined on a global level, the R&D analysis was conducted on 
the global level. In the 2005 R&D ranking of pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer occupied the 
first place, followed by GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis and Johnson&Johnson (see Table 
4).  
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Table 4: Ranking of pharmaceutical companies according to R&D investments, 2005 
Company R&D, m British pounds R&D/sales 
1. Pfizer, USA 4334.81 14.5 
2. Johnson & Johnson, USA 3676.81 12.5 
3. GlaxoSmithKline, UK 3136.00 14.5 
4. Novartis, Switzerland 2822.69 15.0 
5. Sanofi-Aventis, France 2778.62 14.8 
6. Roche, Switzerland 2521.44 16.1 
7. Merck, USA 2241.38 17.5 
8. AstraZeneca, UK 1968.20 14.1 
9. Eli Lilly, USA 1762.29 20.7 
10. Wyeth, USA 1601.46 14.7 
Source: DTI (2006) 
Complementary to the general ranking of pharmaceutical companies according to R&D 
investments in Table 4, the subsequent Table 5 displays the R&D expenditures of Pfizer and 
Pharmacia before and after the merger. The data shows that R&D expenditures are in general 
very volatile. Thus, fluctuations of the joint R&D expenses cannot be directly interpreted as a 
reaction to the merger. Nevertheless, it can be stated that post-merger, Pfizer has not 
significantly reduced its R&D expenditures. This indicates that the R&D activity remains on a 
similar level as before the merger. The talks with industry insiders also confirmed this 
finding: R&D competition has neither strengthened nor weakened due to the merger. The 
effect that there is one competitor less in the market is countered by the fact that the larger 
firm can also tackle larger research projects which were not within the realms of possibility 
for either one of the two firms before the merger. In sum, it is difficult to say which effect 
prevails in the Pfizer and Pharmacia case, but no short-term negative effect can be observed. 
Furthermore, innovation intensity - as measured by the ratio of R&D to sales - has not 
changed considerably after the merger.  
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Table 5: Innovation indicators of Pfizer and Pharmacia before and after the merger  
Year Company R&D,  
m British 
pounds 
Joint R&D, 
m British 
pounds 
Patents R&D/ 
sales 
Joint R&D/ 
Joint sales 
1993 Pfizer 658.60  90 0.13  
1994 Pfizer 728.28  70 0.14  
1995 Pfizer 929.02 1736.42 86 0.14 0.16 
1995 Pharmacia 
& Upjohn 
807.40 1736.42 74 0.18 0.16 
1996 Pfizer 984.05 1723.84 119 0.15 0.16 
1996 Pharmacia 
& Upjohn 
739.79 1723.84 76 0.18 0.16 
1997 Pfizer 1171.75 1911.39 131 0.16 0.17 
1997 Pharmacia 
& Upjohn 
739.64 1911.39 73 0.18 0.17 
1998 Pfizer 1369.76 2090.40 186 0.17 0.17 
1998 Pharmacia 
& Upjohn 
720.64 2090.40 58 0.18 0.17 
1999 Pfizer 1722.41 2612.15 226 0.20 0.20 
1999 Pharmacia 
& Upjohn 
(new name: 
Pharmacia) 
889.74 2612.15 125 0.20 0.20 
2000 Pfizer 2968.94 4811.89 257 0.15 0.15 
2000 Pharmacia 1842.95 4811.89 178 0.15 0.15 
2001 Pfizer 3346.45 4908.86 211 0.15 0.15 
2001 Pharmacia 1562.41 4908.86 180 0.16 0.15 
2002 Pfizer 3215.11 4680.42 204 0.16 0.16 
2002 Pharmacia 1465.31 4680.42 227 0.17 0.16 
2003 Pfizer 3983.58 3983.58 106* 0.16 0.16 
2004 Pfizer 4002.29 4002.29 5* 0.15 0.15 
2005 Pfizer 4334.81 4334.81  0.15 0.15 
Source: R&D DTI Scoreboards for various years, own calculations 
Note: *Patent applications are published with a delay of 18 months. The grant of a patent can take further 18 
months or considerably longer so that the numbers for 2003 and 2004 must be considered as tentative.  
4.6 Analysis of generics competition 
An assessment of the impact of the merger on generics competition belongs to the standard 
merger investigation framework conducted by the European competition authorities 
(European Commission, 2008). While studying the ex-post effects of mergers, the 
development of the generics market should be analyzed under the merger decision and 
alternative scenarios (i.e., how the generics market would have evolved without the merger). 
The market for generics covered by health insurance has grown considerably during the past 
years in Switzerland - a development which could have increased the competitive pressure on 
the brand-name drugs producers. In 2006 alone, it has increased by 46.4% in comparison to 
2005 (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Switzerland: Generics market, m CHF 
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Source: Pharma-Markt Schweiz (Issue 2007) 
Note: The numbers are based on ex-factory prices 
It is difficult to isolate the effects of different mergers and market factors on generics 
competition. With respect to the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia, it can only be observed that 
a number of new products which were introduced in the Swiss pharmaceutical market, have in 
fact been products of generics drugs producers which directly compete with Pfizer’s products 
(in particular in the product categories R05F cough suppressants and expectorants, 
combinations, R01B nasal decongestants for systemic use, and C08A calcium antagonist 
plain).  
The available information does not allow one to answer the question whether Pfizer renounces 
the introduction of generics while the original drug was previously offered by Pfizer.12 The 
behaviour of Pfizer in product markets for which the patent has expired can be observed, for 
example, in the market C2A, i.e., market for products against high blood pressure. In this 
market, Pfizer offered Cardura and Minipress, whereas Pharmacia was present with its 
products Loniten and Nipruss. For Minipress, Loniten and Nipruss, patent protection for the 
active substances they contain, has expired. Therefore, even if, due to the merger, competition 
among these drugs is deferred, producers of generic drugs could offer products with the same 
active substance. Currently, Pfizer is selling Cardura and Loniten. Schwarz Pharma is selling 
Nipruss. Minipress is not recorded on the list of the products sold by Pfizer Switzerland.   
4.7 Analysis of IPRs 
Patents can be used to foreclose a market for competitors. With a merger, a joint patent 
portfolio can be created which covers potential substitute products to the extent that 
competitors cannot introduce competing products to the market. Thus, patents can be used as 
an entry barrier since the firms who would like to become active in a specific market depend 
                                                 
12  In Pfizer’s Financial Report (Pfizer, 2004) it has been mentioned that in 2004 Pfizer sold certain European generic pharmaceutical 
businesses. 
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on IPRs. Unresolved IPR issues have been named as one of the key issues that often threaten 
the commercial viability of the purchaser of the divested assets (see European Commission, 
2005). 
In the market for ED drugs, the patent rights were not clearly defined and allocated at the time 
of the merger decision. After the success of Viagra also Pharmacia, among several other 
companies, was working on the development of ED drugs. The European Commission had 
concerns not only regarding the strong market position of Viagra, but also regarding the 
ongoing patent disputes connected with Viagra13, which could have impeded the market entry 
of actual and potential competitors. The FTC confirmed this general concern in their 
investigation and argued that the patent disputes would make market entry by companies 
other than Pharmacia unlikely or at least delay it for a period of up to two years. 
With regard to content, it was disputed whether Pfizer has protected the oral administration of 
the drug since this would not be an invention.14 After granting the method-of-use patent EP-
B-0702555, containing claims for the use of any PDE inhibitor for the manufacture of an ED 
oral treatment, a number of companies filed a complaint, among them Bayer Schering and Eli 
Lilly. This complaint was sustained and the patent was revoked. Pfizer appealed this decision 
on October 11, 2001. This claim by Pfizer was dismissed on February 3, 2005.15 
The merging parties proposed to divest Pharmacia’s product at the development stage which 
would fall into the same market as Viagra. Such an unconditional remedy is reasonable in so 
far as there is no uncertainty about the behaviour of the merging parties. With this divestiture, 
Pharmacia has no possibility to impede or to delay the development of the product since it 
could compete with in-house Viagra. For the purchaser of the new product, the only risk is the 
development success and not the scope of protection by patents connected to the product.16  
At the time of the merger notification, the patent which could have prevented entry of 
substitutes of Viagra was cancelled. Under these circumstances, the divestiture of rights for 
Apomorphine according to Schedule V of the EU merger decision (European Commission, 
2003) contributes to the growth of a substitute product by a competitor. With a decision in the 
patent proceedings which would have revoked the cancellation of the patent, the rights for the 
ED nasal spray would have lost value for a competitor to Pfizer as it would not have led to the 
introduction of a new product on the market without additional licensing rights. In this case, 
rather the in-house development of the nasal spray would have led to a market introduction.  
Meanwhile – after the approval of the Pfizer and Pharmacia merger – substitutes of Viagra 
have entered the market: Cialis (Eli Lilly), Levitra (Bayer Schering) and Uprima (Abbott) as 
has been mentioned before.  
4.8 Analysis of the effects on sales, employment and investment 
In its decision, the COMCO stated that Pfizer and Pharmacia could realize a substantial 
synergy potential in the field of sales and marketing. This was justified by a larger financial 
power and a wider range of products offered by the merged company. Table 6 displays that 
the joint sales of Pfizer and Pharmacia - after a decrease in 2003 - has almost reached the 
                                                 
13  Particularly, Pfizer has commenced patent litigation proceedings in the US against a number of competitors. These competitors were 
developing products similar to Viagra. Pfizer has filed a protest against the decision of the European Patent Office since its European 
patent was declared void due to this decision. 
14  According to Article 52 (1) of the European Patent Convention, “European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application“ (European Patent Office, 
2007).  
15  See http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t011212eu1.htm. 
16  This is the case because a patent in the pharmaceutical field defines the property rights much more precisely than in other industries such 
as, e.g., the semiconductor industry. The basic explanation for this observation is that an active ingredient is described by a molecule. 
Thus, it is immediately evident whether an active ingredient is protected by a patent or not. 
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level of 2002 by 2004. However, in order to draw stronger conclusions regarding the possible 
effects of the merger, a longer period of time should be investigated.  
Table 6: Employment, sales and investment of Pfizer and Pharmacia before and after 
the merger  
Year Company Employment Joint 
employment 
Sales, 
m British 
pounds 
Joint sales, 
m British 
pounds 
Capital 
expenditures, 
m British 
pounds 
1993 Pfizer   5054   
1994 Pfizer   5293   
1995 Pfizer   6454 10929  
1995 Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
  4475 10929  
1996 Pfizer   6607 10800  
1996 Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
  4193 10800  
1997 Pfizer   7407 11410  
1997 Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
  4003 11410  
1998 Pfizer   8140 12202  
1998 Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
  4062 12202  
1999 Pfizer 51000 82000 8769 13269  
1999 Pharmacia & 
Upjohn (new 
name: Pharmacia) 
31000 82000 4500 13269  
2000 Pfizer 90000 149000 19798 31944 1466.87 
2000 Pharmacia 59000 149000 12146 31944 907.86 
2001 Pfizer 90000 149600 22272 31825 1536.77 
2001 Pharmacia 59600 149600 9553 31825 697.37 
2002 Pfizer 98000 141000 20109 28801 1085.89 
2002 Pharmacia 43000 141000 8692 28801 704.05 
2003 Pfizer 122000 122000 25243 25243 1468.91 
2004 Pfizer 115000 115000 27354 27354 1359.09 
Source: R&D DTI Scoreboards for various years, own calculations 
With respect to employment effects, a decrease in the number of employees worldwide after 
the merger is evident: in 2004 this number has decreased by 18.4% in comparison to 2002. In 
other studies, it has been stated that employment in the merged company on average reduces 
by 8-13% after the merger (see CRA, 2004). However, no evidence was found that the Pfizer 
and Pharmacia merger led to significant layoffs in Switzerland. Although no information has 
been found on the number of employees for the merged company in Switzerland, the overall 
figures on employment in the Swiss pharmaceutical industry do not show any downward 
trend in recent years. On the contrary, according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, the 
number of employees engaged in production and wholesale and retail trade with 
pharmaceutical products has been increasing between 1995 and 2005 (see BFS, 2007). 
The joint capital expenditures of the merged company worldwide have decreased. This may 
be attributed to the reorganization of the company, optimization of global manufacturing and 
product rationalization that has taken place after the merger. Duplicative facilities, functions, 
organizations and systems were eliminated following the merger (see Pfizer 2003 Financial 
Report (Pfizer, 2003)). The merger may have pre-empted the resources necessary for the 
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commissioning of new investments and reduced competitive pressure to install new capacity 
to maintain or gain market shares.  
4.9 Overall evaluation of actual and potential competition 
Summing up the key findings of the overall evaluation of the merger, Table 7 compares the 
COMCO predictions of the effects of the Pfizer and Pharmacia merger with the actual 
developments in the Swiss pharmaceutical markets. 
Table 7: Summary of the analysis  
Overall evaluation of actual and potential competition 
according to COMCO predictions  
Actual developments after the 
merger 
Overall evaluation of actual competition  
The market share increases due to the merger are either 
minor or there are other important competitors in the 
respective markets 
This corresponds to the actual 
developments after the merger 
It was stated that competition could only be restricted in 
the product categories G4B3 and G4B4 (in G4B3, due to 
Pfizer’s high market share and the development of a 
follow-up product by Pharmacia, and in G4B4, due to 
Pharmacia’s high market share and the development of a 
follow-up product by Pfizer) 
Pfizer has lost market share in the 
market for ED drugs 
The market structure is rather stable but varies in the 
different product categories  
This corresponds to the actual 
developments after the merger 
The merger will not lead to the creation or the 
strengthening of a collectively dominant market position 
  
Generally true (however, an 
investigation regarding the 
recommended retail prices for 
Viagra, Levitra and Cialis was 
initiated) 
The merger can lead to an increased competitive 
pressure on different production and distribution levels 
from manufacturing to retail (physicians, pharmacists, 
drugstores, hospitals) 
No evidence for an increased 
competitive pressure was found 
Pfizer and Pharmacia will have more funds for R&D as 
well as for sales and marketing than their competitors. 
No impairment of the R&D activity is to be anticipated 
(with the exception of G4B3 and G4B4) 
Pfizer’s R&D expenditures have 
slightly decreased; no  
impairment of R&D activity was 
detected 
Pfizer and Pharmacia can also realize a substantial 
synergy potential in the field of sales and marketing 
Data restrictions foreclosed an 
analysis of possible synergy 
effects 
All in all, the merger will not restrain actual competition 
considerably  
This corresponds to the actual 
developments after the merger 
Overall evaluation of potential competition  
Market entry costs are very high (due to, e.g., the high 
development costs of a drug, the high development risks 
and further costs and time exposure for the registration 
at Swissmedic)  
True 
Nevertheless, possibilities for market entry are present 
given the numerous potential competitors of Pfizer and 
Pharmacia who can penetrate market segments 
dominated by Pfizer and Pharmacia (e.g., smaller, more 
True, although Pfizer possesses an 
important patent portfolio which 
could impede market entries 
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specialized firms or new generics competitors) 
In sum, potential competition is existent in the Swiss 
pharmaceutical market 
This corresponds to the actual 
developments after the merger 
Overall, no considerable impact of the merger on actual or potential competition in the Swiss 
pharmaceutical market was found. The market structure seems to be rather stable overall, 
however, varies within the different product categories. The competitive situation has been 
correctly assessed by the COMCO - for example, with respect to the presence of market entry 
barriers or the role of potential competition. Generally, the dynamic structure of the market 
often complicates the interpretation of market share developments after the merger.  
5 The Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) merger: Findings from the 
evaluation of the remedies  
5.1 Description of the remedies 
The COMCO approved the merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia under the condition that the 
companies divest the compound Darifenacin as well as transfer the rights of Pharmacia to 
develop and commercialize Apomorphine hydrochloride nasal spray for ED treatment to a 
third party. These remedies aimed at solving the competition concerns in the market of 
products for the treatment of incontinence and in the market of ED drugs. Respective 
references were made to Schedule III and IV of the EU merger decision (European 
Commission, 2003), although it was not approved officially at the time of the COMCO 
merger decision.  
5.2 Analysis of the effects of the remedies 
5.2.1 The market „Products for the treatment of ED“ 
At the time of the merger notification, Pfizer’s Viagra had a dominant position in the market 
for ED drugs. Moreover, Pfizer was already developing the second generation of Viagra-like 
products for this market. Pfizer’s dominant position could have been strengthened with the 
additional product of Pharmacia, namely Apomorphine hydrochloride nasal spray. In order to 
solve the competition concerns in this market, the parties suggested transferring the rights of 
Pharmacia to develop and commercialize this product on a worldwide basis as well as 
Pharmacia’s exclusive world-wide licence to Nastech’s patents and patent applications 
directed to the formulation of the nasal spray (see Schedule IV of the EU merger decision). 
In 2002, Apomorphine was in test phase II of the clinical trials. It was anticipated that the new 
administration of the product could remove some disadvantageous effects of the current 
Apomorphine-based product Uprima. According to the data available, since March 1, 2005 
Uprima has been taken off the Swiss market. The inhalation-based Apomorphine – due to the 
non-invasive method of administration (nasal spray) – could become a potential alternative to 
Viagra and harbour a significant future growth potential.  
In the EU merger case analysis (European Commission, 2003), the interviewed experts stated 
that both products, Apomorphine and Dopamine D2 receptor, have good prospects to enter the 
market. Both of these Pharmacia products could negatively affect actual and potential 
competition, however, only in the case that Pfizer maintains its currently strong market 
position and patent litigation disputes in this product category cannot be terminated. 
Furthermore, the experts mentioned that Pharmacia was also developing two non-PDE5 
products for the ED treatment. 
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According to Schedule IV of the European Commission, the rights for Apomorphine were to 
be transferred to Nastech Pharmaceutical Company. The COMCO adopted this divestiture in 
exactly the same way in its decision. Moreover, in order to guarantee its implementation, 
Pfizer was ordered to support Nastech financially and technically regarding the product. In 
2003, Nastech had reclaimed its rights regarding Apomorphine and intended to find a new 
partner for the product development (Nastech, 2003a).  
In June 2003, Nastech announced the initiation of a Phase II dose-ranging safety study using 
intranasal Apomorphine hydrochloride for the treatment of ED. The purpose of the study was 
to investigate incremental doses of the product in order to establish the maximum tolerated 
safe dosage and to determine specific doses to be investigated in future clinical studies. The 
study was not aimed to make any efficacy assessments. This dose-ranging safety study is one 
of several studies designed by Nastech and Pharmacia in accordance with their discussions 
with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to advance the ED program toward pivotal 
Phase III trials and to commercialization. Nastech was mentioned to be in discussions with 
certain major pharmaceutical companies to re-partner the product for worldwide development 
and commercialization (Nastech, 2003b). In July 2003 Nastech received a “Notice of 
Allowance” from the US Patent and Trademark Office for a patent application relating to 
“Nasal Delivery of Apomorphine” (Nastech, 2003c). In March 2004 Nastech received 
positive results from a Phase II maximum tolerated dose study, initiated in June 2003. The 
following step for this program had been to submit this data together with protocols for 
further studies to the FDA and to obtain regulatory guidance on a program intended to permit 
the development, and if successful, approval and marketing of the nasal spray (Nastech, 
2004).  
There were some predictions by analysts that the drug could reach the market by late 2006, 
however the drug is still not on the market and no additional information on the current status 
of the product - especially as to when Apomorphine could be expected to enter the Swiss 
market - were found. It is therefore not yet possible to evaluate whether the Apomorphine 
divestiture has been successful. It is only possible to state that Nastech has enough experience 
in this field, partly due to a former cooperation with Pharmacia. 
5.2.2 The market „Products for the treatment of urinary incontinence“ 
At the time of the merger notification, Pharmacia’s Detrusitol held a dominant position in the 
market of drugs for the treatment of urinary incontinence. During this period, Pfizer’s 
Darifenacin was in the last development stage and the merger could have strengthened the 
dominant market position of the merged entity. In order to solve the competition concerns in 
this market, Pfizer and Pharmacia offered to divest the product candidate Darifenacin 
worldwide.  
According to Schedule III of the European Commission - which has been adopted by the 
COMCO in exactly the same way - Novartis bought Darifenacin (Novartis, 2003).17 In the 
US, the new drug application for Darifenacin, under the name Enablex, was submitted in 
December 2002, approved in 2003, and the product entered the US market in 2004. In Europe, 
the product entered the market in 2004 under the name Emselex (Novartis, 2004).  
The FTC’s investigation concluded that Novartis is a competent company to continue Pfizer’s 
development efforts and act as buyer of Darifenacin assets without individual competition 
concerns. Unfortunately, no data was available for this market for our study which would 
                                                 
17  In Pfizer’s Financial Report (Pfizer, 2003) it has been mentioned that Novartis had bought Darifenacin for USD 225 m. Pfizer received 
USD 50 m after signing the transaction, while the rest of the amount were to be paid when and if Darifenacin receives regulatory 
approvals.  
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have allowed a closer evaluation of the effectiveness of the divestiture in this market, or at 
least assess the current market position of the divested product.  
In the EU merger decision, a couple of companies have been mentioned which were working 
on similar products, among them Schwarz Pharma with the product Fesoterodine and 
AstraZeneca. Even though Pfizer had to transfer the rights for Darifenacin, Pfizer’s 
commitment still seems to exist in this market since it was announced that the purchase of a 
competitor product of Darifenacin is considered by Pfizer.18 In fact, Pfizer has bought 
exclusive world-wide rights for NCE Fesoterodine from Schwarz Pharma. Both firms have 
resolved all patent litigation disputes and patent claims with regard to this product. 
5.2.3 Overall evaluation of the remedies 
Regarding Darifenacin, one might conclude that the remedy was successful. The product has 
entered the market although - due to the lack of data - it remains an open question as to how 
successful this market entry has been. However, Novartis has sufficient experience in this 
product category and thus seems to be a good choice as buyer of Darifenacin. 
The success of the Apomorphine remedy is even more difficult to judge. Nastech has a lot of 
experience in the field, but it intended to find another partner for the product development. 
However, it remains unclear whether such a partner has been found or what major obstacles 
have been encountered during the search process. Furthermore, there has been no publicly 
available information on the further development of this product since 2004. However, 
generally, the market for products for the treatment of ED has two strong new competitors – 
Eli Lilly and Bayer Schering – and as a result, Pfizer has considerably lost market share in the 
last couple of years. In this respect, one might raise doubts whether the divestiture of 
Apomorphine was really necessary to solve the competition concerns.  
Since both remedies were proposed by the merging parties, an investigation as to whether the 
same effect could have been achieved with weaker interventions is not necessary. Only 
Pfizer’s efforts to introduce a competitive product for the sold product Darifenacin to the 
market could be seen critically. A temporary non-competition clause which would have given 
the buyer of the rights for Darifenacin a sufficiently long period of time to bring a competitive 
product into the market would have been worth consideration. In retrospect, it was revealed 
that with Novartis, a competent buyer for Darifenacin was found. Thus, Pfizer’s efforts 
concerning Fesoterodine could be viewed as harmless. In the event that Darifenacin would not 
have developed into a competitive product that quickly, a deployment of the COMCO 
decision could have pronounced a temporary non-compete clause. This assessment holds 
under the provision that an equivalent regulation is not contained in the EU decision within 
the scope of the censored “fall-back” remedy.  
The general extent to which the COMCO may or can adopt the decision of the European 
Commission systematically should be considered from a legal point of view. In the present 
case, the chosen approach was reasonable. However, risks might still be contained in case this 
practice is thoughtlessly applied to future merger cases. The EU merger decision could be 
more detailed than the Swiss merger decision and pronounced undertakings could be 
withdrawn or weakened after the deployment of the COMCO has already been pronounced. 
In order to forestall such a case it is necessary to determine the minimum requirements for 
undertakings related to the Swiss market. In doing so, it could be ensured that the effective 
EU remedies meet the requirements in the Swiss market. It can be anticipated that globally 
active firms such as Pfizer rather meet the stricter commitments by the European Commission 
                                                 
18  See http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/41688.php.  
 28
in order to be allowed to stay active in the European market than renounce the European 
market to meet possibly less strict Swiss commitments and focus solely on the Swiss market.  
Conversely, a stricter commitment in Switzerland involves the danger that a firm completely 
retreats from the Swiss market since it would potentially invoke a loss to a lesser degree than 
to renounce the European market – a possibility which must also be taken into consideration. 
In the present case, the pronounced commitments are based on suggestions by the applicants. 
Thus, it can be assumed that the merging parties are unlikely to take any actions to abuse 
those commitments. The COMCO was also not exposed to the danger that its remedies were 
stricter than in the decision of the European Commission. However, what generally needs to 
be taken into account is that the merging parties typically have substantial information 
advantages with respect to the likely effect and consequences of merger remedies.  
6 Conclusion  
The ex-post assessment of merger effects is a hot topic in antitrust law and economics. On the 
one hand, such analyses allow the identification of structural problems in the assessments of 
competition authorities and therefore contribute to the continuous improvement of practical 
antitrust policy. On the other hand, ex-post assessments of merger effects allow the estimation 
of the welfare contributions of antitrust policy through comparisons of the actual development 
after decisions and the counterfactual scenarios of no investigations and decisions.  
Against this background, the paper studies the effects of one particular merger, namely the 
merger of Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) on competition in the Swiss pharmaceutical market 
and compares the assessment of the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) with the post-
merger market developments. We basically find that the merger did not have a huge influence 
on the overall competitive landscape of the Swiss pharmaceutical market. This key finding is 
driven by the fact that the product portfolios of both companies show only two cases of 
critical overlaps and subsequent potential anticompetitive effects. In both cases, remedies 
were implemented which prevented the companies from strengthening their dominant market 
position.  
In particular, the imposed divestiture in the ED drugs market prevented that patent rights 
alone could have hindered market entry of new products. The patent issue was not subject to 
any assessment of competitive effects and as a consequence, the competition authority would 
not have been able to intervene for a possible case of market foreclosure. In case of the 
market for drugs for the treatment of urinary incontinence, a strengthening of the dominant 
market position of Pharmacia with its product Detrusitol could have been avoided by the 
divestiture. With Novartis, a competent buyer was located which has already introduced the 
product to the market. 
In the other markets which showed significant overlaps in the business fields of both firms or 
in which one of the firms had a dominant market position, no effects of the merger can be 
expected either due to the existing price regulation in the Swiss pharmaceutical market or due 
to changes in Pfizer’s product portfolio. Furthermore, it is important to note that some 
potential effects of the merger on market parameters such as innovation behaviour, R&D 
efforts or employment can be at best analyzed on the global company level. A conclusion on 
the effect of the merger on these parameters cannot be isolated with the data at hand. 
In sum, it can be said that the COMCO was correct in its assessment of the overall impact of 
the merger on competition in the Swiss pharmaceutical market. Generally, the case study 
raises the question how mergers should be assessed from the competition authorities’ point of 
view when the merging firms are headquartered abroad and these firms have a strong global 
presence. Many effects take place on the global level such as the development of innovation 
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and marketing strategies. Therefore, the undertakings must often be viewed as active on an 
international or world-wide market. Within this context, the question of an appropriate 
organization of international cooperation between competition authorities arises. Specifically, 
overlapping areas in merger control investigations should be detected to avoid the duplication 
of efforts and to make efficient use of the existing resources and expertise of the competition 
authorities - and also to minimize the administrative burden imposed on the merging parties.  
Although this paper has focused on an ex-post evaluation of a single merger decision, it nicely 
illustrates the fundamental problems of ex-post studies. In order to fully evaluate the work of 
the competition authority in a particular case, detailed data (and complementary information) 
is necessary to allow the use of more sophisticated econometric techniques. However, such 
information is typically difficult to acquire, largely due to data confidentiality issues. 
Furthermore, it should be reminded that this paper focused on an assessment of a single 
merger and therefore does not allow any conclusion on a more general level. An evaluation of 
the overall merger enforcement policy in Switzerland or another country is forced to use a 
much larger sample of mergers in order to allow the derivation of broader conclusions about 
the state of merger control and possible reform needs.   
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8 Appendix 
Table 8. Market shares before the merger, % (as contained in the COMCO merger 
decision) 
Company 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 
Market G2A    
Pfizer 0.1-10 0.1-10 0.1-10 
Pharmacia 30-40 40-50 30-40 
Novartis 30-40 40-50 40-50 
Schering AG 20-30 10-20 10-20 
Market A7A    
Pfizer 10-20 10-20 30-40 
Pharmacia - - - 
Abbott 20-30 30-40 0.1-10 
Drossapharm 20-30 20-30 40-50 
Sanofi-Synthelabo 20-30 10-20 - 
Bioforce 0.1-10 0.1-10 10-20 
Market G4B3    
Pfizer 80-90 90-100 90-100 
Pharmacia 0.1-10 0.1-10 0.1-10 
Abbot - - 0.1-10 
Astra Zeneca 0.1-10 0.1-10 0.1-10 
Market G4B4    
Pfizer - - - 
Pharmacia 40-50 50-60 60-70 
Madaus 20-30 20-30 20-30 
Sanofi-Synthelabo 10-20 10-20 0,1-10 
Pierre Fabre 0.1-10 0.1-10 0.1-10 
Novartis 0.1-10 0.1-10 0.1-10 
Source: COMCO merger decision (published in RPW/DPC 2003/2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34
Table 9. Market shares before and after the merger, % 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Market G2A      
Bayer Schering 0 0 0.9 0 0.4 
Novartis 
Pharma 
84.5 84.7 85.3 85.5 89.4 
Pfizer 15.5 14.7 13.8 13.4 10.3 
Ferring 0 0.5 0 1.1 0 
Market A7A      
Abbott 25.8 0.05 0 0 0 
Bioforce 23.9 29.0 28.1 26.3 28.3 
Drossapharm 25.2 32.8 30.9 25.4 24.9 
Pfizer 25.2 38.2 41.1 48.4 46.8 
Sanofi-Aventis 0.2 0 0 0 0 
Market G4B3      
Abbott 0 5.5 2.2 0.6 0.01 
Bayer Schering 0 0 4.0 15.9 14.5 
Eli Lilly 0 0 0 9.6 23.7 
Meda Pharma 2.6 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 
Pfizer 97.4 92.5 92.3 72.7 60.7 
Source: IMS Health Switzerland, own estimations 
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Figure 5: Market G2A: Price developments before and after the merger, CHF 
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Source: IMS Health Switzerland, own estimations 
Note: An average price for each drug is calculated as the ratio of sales revenue and quantity sold 
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Figure 6: Market A7A: Price developments before and after the merger, CHF 
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Source: IMS Health Switzerland, own estimations 
Note: An average price for each drug is calculated as the ratio of sales revenue and quantity sold 
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Figure 7: Market G4B3: Price developments before and after the merger, CHF 
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Source: IMS Health Switzerland, own estimations 
Note: An average price for each drug is calculated as the ratio of sales revenue and quantity sold 
